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Abstract
We consider a standard cash in advance monetary model with ﬂexible
prices or prices set in advance and show that there are interest rate or
money supply rules such that equilibria are unique. The existence of these
single instrument rules depends on whether the economy has an inﬁnite
horizon or an arbitrarily large but ﬁnite horizon.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we revisit the issue of multiplicity of equilibria when monetary policy
is conducted with either the interest rate or the money supply as the instrument of
∗We thank Andy Neumeyer for comments. We gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support of
FCT. The opinions are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Banco de Portugal, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
†Teles is also aﬃliated with Banco de Portugal and Universidade Catolica Portuguesa.policy. There has been an extensive literature on this topic starting with Sargent
and Wallace (1975), including a recent literature on local and global determinacy
in models with nominal rigidities. We show that it is possible to implement
a unique equilibrium with an appropriately chosen interest rate feedback rule,
and similarly with a money supply feedback rule of the same type. This is a
surprising result because while it is well known that interest rate feedback rules
can deliver a locally unique equilibrium, it is no less known that they generate
multiple equilibria globally.
We show that the reason for the results is the model assumption of an inﬁnite
horizon. In ﬁnite horizon economies, the number of degrees of freedom in con-
ducting policy does not depend on the way policy is conducted. The number is
the same independently of whether interest rates are set as constant functions of
the state, or as backward, current or forward functions of endogenous variables.
In analogous ﬁnite horizon economies, the number of degrees of freedom in
conducting policy can be counted exactly. The equilibrium is described by a
system of equations where the unknowns are the quantities, prices and policy
variables. There are more unknowns than variables, and the diﬀerence is the
number of degrees of freedom in conducting policy. It is a necessary condition for
there to be a unique equilibrium that the same number of exogenous restrictions
on the policy variables are added to the system of equations. Single instrument
policies are not suﬃcient restrictions. They always generate multiple equilibria.
This is no longer the case in the inﬁnite horizon economy, as we show in this
paper.
Whether the appropriate description of the world is an inﬁnite horizon economy
or the limit of ﬁnite horizon economies, thus, makes a big diﬀerence for this
particular issue of policy interest, i. e. whether policy conducted with a single
instrument, such as the nominal interest rate, is suﬃcient to determine a unique
competitive equilibrium.
As already mentioned, after Sargent and Wallace (1975), there is a large liter-
ature on multiplicity of equilibria when the government follows either an interest
rate rule or a money supply rule. This includes the literature on local determinacy
that identiﬁes conditions on preferences, technology, timing of markets, and policy
rules, under which there is a unique local equilibrium (see Bernanke and Wood-
ford (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001a,
2001b), Benhabib, Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2001a), Dupor (2001) among oth-
ers). This literature has in turn been criticized by recent work on global stability
that makes the point that the conditions for local determinacy are also conditions
2for global indeterminacy (see Benhabib, Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2001b) and
Christiano and Rostagno, 2002).
Our modelling approach is close to Adao, Correia and Teles (2003) for the case
with sticky prices. In this paper we show that even at the optimal zero interest
rate rule there is still room for policy to improve welfare since it is possible to use
money supply to implement the optimal allocation in a large set of implementable
allocations. This paper is also very close to Adao, Correia and Teles (2004) where
we show that it is possible to implement unique equilibria in environments with
ﬂexible prices and prices set in advance by pegging state contingent interest rates
as well as the initial money supply. Bloise, Dreze and Polemarchakis (2003) and
Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2003) are also related research.
We assume that ﬁscal policy is endogenous. Exogeneity of ﬁscal policy could
be used, as in the ﬁscal theory of the price level to determine unique equilibria.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1, we consider a simple cash in ad-
vance economy with ﬂexible prices. In Section 2, we show that there are single
instrument feedback rules that implement a unique equilibrium. In Section 3 we
show that in analogous ﬁnite horizon environments the single instrument rules
would generate multiple equilibria. In Section 4, we show that the results gener-
alize to the case where prices are set in advance. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks.
2. A model with ﬂexible prices
We ﬁrst consider a simple cash in advance economy with ﬂexible prices. The
economy consists of a representative household, a representative ﬁrm behaving
competitively, and a government. The uncertainty in period t ≥ 0 is described
by the random variable st ∈ St and the history of its realizations up to period t
(state or node at t), (s0,s 1,...,st),i sd e n o t e db yst ∈ St. The initial realization s0
is given. We assume that the history of shocks has a discrete distribution. The
number of states in period t is Φt.
Production uses labor according to a linear technology. We impose a cash-
in-advance constraint on the households’ transactions with the timing structure
described in Lucas and Stokey (1983). That is, each period is divided into two
subperiods, with the assets market operational in the ﬁrst subperiod and the goods
market in the second.
32.1. Competitive equilibria
Households The households have preferences over consumption Ct, and leisure









where β is a discount factor. The households start period t with nominal wealth
Wt. They decide to hold money, Mt, and to buy Bt nominal bonds that pay RtBt
one period later. Rt is the gross nominal interest rate at date t. They also buy
Bt,t+1 units of state contingent nominal securities. Each security pays one unit of
money at the beginning of period t +1in a particular state. Let Qt,t+1 be the
beginning of period t price of these securities normalized by the probability of
the occurrence of the state. Therefore, households spend EtQt,t+1Bt,t+1 in state
contingent nominal securities. Thus, in the assets market at the beginning of
period t they face the constraint
Mt + Bt + EtQt,t+1Bt,t+1 ≤ Wt (2.2)
Consumption must be purchased with money according to the cash in advance
constraint
PtCt ≤ Mt. (2.3)
At the end of the period, the households receive the labor income WtNt, where
Nt =1− Lt is labor and Wt is the nominal wage rate and pay lump sum taxes,
Tt. Thus, the nominal wealth households bring to period t +1is
Wt+1 = Mt + RtBt + Bt,t+1 − PtCt + WtNt − Tt (2.4)
The households’ problem is to maximize expected utility (2.1) subject to the
restrictions (2.2), (2.4), (2.3), together with a no-Ponzi games condition on the
holdings of assets.






















, t ≥ 0 (2.7)
From these conditions we get EtQt,t+1 = 1
Rt.Condition (2.5) sets the intratem-
poral marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equal to the
real wage adjusted for the cost of using money, Rt.C o n d i t i o n ( 2 . 6 ) i s a n i n -
tertemporal marginal condition necessary for the optimal choice of risk-free nom-
inal bonds. Condition (2.7) determines the price of one unit of money at time
t +1 , for each state of nature st+1, normalized by the conditional probability of
occurrence of state st+1, in units of money at time t.
Firms The ﬁrms are competitive and prices are ﬂexible. The production func-
tion of the representative ﬁrm is linear
Yt ≤ AtNt




Government The policy variables are taxes, Tt, interest rates, Rt, money sup-
plies, Mt, state noncontingent public debt, Bt.W ec a nd e ﬁne a policy as a map-
ping for the policy variables {Tt,R t,M t,B t, t ≥ 0,a l lst}, that maps sequences of
quantities, prices and policy variables into sets of sequences of the policy variables.
Deﬁning a policy as a correspondence allows for the case where the government
is not explicit about some of the policy variables. Lucas and Stokey (1983) deﬁne
policy as sequences of numbers for some of the variables. Adao, Correia and Teles
(2003) deﬁne policy as sequences of numbers for all the policy variables. Here
we allow for more generic functions (correspondences) for all the policy variables.
We do not allow for targeting rules that can be deﬁned as mappings from prices,
quantities and policy variables to prices and quantities.
The period by period government budget constraints are
Mt + Bt = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Pt−1Gt−1 − Pt−1Tt−1, t ≥ 0
Let Qt+1 ≡ Q0,t+1,w i t hQ0 =1 .I flimT→∞ EtQT+1WT+1 =0
∞ X
s=0
EtQt,t+s+1Mt+s (Rt+s − 1) = Wt +
∞ X
s=0
EtQt,t+s+1Pt+s [Gt+s − Tt+s] (2.9)
5Market clearing Market clearing in the goods and labor market requires
Ct + Gt ≤ AtNt,
1 − Lt = Nt.
We have already imposed market clearing in the money and debt markets.
Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of policy variables, quan-
tities and prices such that the private agents maximize given the sequences of
policy variables and prices, the budget constraint of the government is satisﬁed
and the policy sequence is in the set deﬁned by the policy.
The equilibrium conditions for the variables {Ct,L t,R t,M t,B t,T t,Q t,t+1} are
the resources constraint
Ct + Gt = At(1 − Lt), t ≥ 0 (2.10)
the intratemporal condition that is obtained from the households intratemporal






, t ≥ 0 (2.11)
as well as the cash in advance constraints (2.3), the intertemporal conditions (2.6)
and (2.7), and the budget constraints (2.9).
3. Single instrument feedback rules.
In this section we assume that policy is conducted with either interest rate or
money supply feedback rules. We show that there are single instrument feedback
rules that implement a unique equilibrium for the allocation and prices. The
proposition for an interest rate feedback rule follows:
Proposition 3.1. When the ﬁscal policy is endogenous and monetary policy is







ξt is an exogenous variable, there is a unique equilibrium.





. Then the intertemporal and intratemporal conditions, (2.6) and (2.11)
c a nb ew r i t t e na s
uC(t)
Pt







, t ≥ 0
These conditions together with the cash in advance conditions, (2.3), and the
resource constraints, (2.10), determine uniquely the variables Ct, Lt, Pt and Mt.
The budget constraints (3.1) are satisﬁed for multiple paths of the taxes and
state noncontingent debt levels¥
An analogous proposition is obtained when policy is conducted with a partic-
ular money supply feedback rule.
Proposition 3.2. When the ﬁscal policy is endogenous and the policy is con-




there is a unique equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose policy is conducted according to the money supply rule Mt =
βRt−1CtuC(t)








obtained from the intertemporal conditions (2.6), in addition to the resource con-
straints, (2.10) and the intratemporal conditions (2.11) determine uniquely the
four variables, Ct, ht, Pt, Rt in each period t ≥ 0 and state st.
The taxes and debt levels satisfy the budget constraint (3.1)¥
7The result that there are single instrument feedback rules that implement a
unique equilibrium is a surprising one. In fact it is well known that interest rate
rules may implement a determinate equilibrium, but not a unique global equilib-
rium. To illustrate this, consider the case where monetary policy is conducted
with constant functions for the policy variables. We will show that in that case
an interest rate policy generates multiple equilibria. That result is directly ex-
tended to the case where the interest rate is a function of contemporaneous or
past variables.
3.0.1. Conducting policy with constant functions.
In this section, we show that in general when policy is conducted with constant
functions for the policy instruments, it is necessary to determine exogenously both
interest rates and money supplies.
The equilibrium conditions are the resources constraints, (2.10), the intratem-
poral conditions (2.11), the cash in advance constraints (2.3), the intertemporal






















These conditions deﬁne a set of equilibrium allocations, prices and policy vari-
ables. There are many equilibria. We want to determine conditions on the ex-
ogeneity of the policy variables such that there is a unique equilibrium in the
allocation and prices. We ﬁrst consider the case in which a policy are sequences
of numbers for money supplies and interest rates.
From the resources constraints,(2.10), the intratemporal conditions (2.11), and
the cash in advance constraints, (2.3), we obtain the functions Ct = C(Rt) and
Lt = L(Rt) and Pt = Mt
C(Rt), t ≥ 0.A s l o n g a s uC(Ct,L t)Ct depends on Ct or
Lt, excluding therefore preferences that are additively separable and logarithmic











, t ≥ 0 (3.2)
together with the budget constraints, (3.1).
8Suppose the path of money supply is set exogenously in every date and state.
In addition, in period zero the interest rate, R0, is set exogenously and, for each
t ≥ 1, for each state st−1, the interest rates are set exogenously in #St −1 states.
In this case there is a single solution for the allocations and prices. Similarly,
there is also a unique equilibrium if the nominal interest rate is set exogenously in
every date and state, and so is the money supply in period 0, M0,a sw e l la s ,f o r
each t ≥ 1, and for state st−1, the money supply in #St − 1 states. The budget
constraints restrict, not uniquely, the taxes and debt levels.
The proposition follows
Proposition 3.3. Suppose policy are constant functions. In general, if money
supply is determined exogenously in every date and state, and if interest rates are
also determined exogenously in the initial period, as well as in Φt−Φt−1 states for
each t ≥ 1, then the allocations and prices can be determined uniquely. Similarly,
if the exogenous policy instruments are the interest rates in every state, the initial
money supply and the money supply, in Φt − Φt−1 states, for t ≥ 1, then there is
in general a unique equilibrium.
The proposition states a general result. In the particular case where the prefer-
ences are additively separable and logarithmic in consumption, and money supply
is set exogenously in every state, there is a unique equilibrium in the allocations
and prices. There is no need to set exogenously the interest rates as well. This
example is helpful in understanding the main point of the paper, that the degrees
of freedom in conduction policy depend on how policy is conducted and on other
characteristics of the environment.
3.0.2. Current or backward interest rate feedback rules .
We have shown Proposition 3.3. assuming that policy was conducted with con-
stant functions for the policy variables. However, the use of interest rate rules
that depend on current or past variables clearly preserves the same degrees of
freedom in the determination of policy, as identiﬁed in that proposition. When
ﬁscal policy is endogenous, it is still necessary to determine exogenously the levels
of money supply in some but not all states. The corollary follows
Corollary 3.4. When policy is conducted with current or backward interest rate
feedback rules and ﬁscal policy is endogenous, there is a unique equilibrium if the
money supply is set exogenously in #St − 1 states, for each state st−1, t ≥ 1,a s
well M0.
94. Robustness: Finite horizon.
We have shown in the previous section that there are interest rate rules that
implement a unique equilibrium but that current or backward feedback rules do
not. This means that even if the same number of instruments is set exogenously,
the remaining degrees of freedom in determining policy depend on how those
degrees of freedom are ﬁlled. This happens because the model economy has an
inﬁnite horizon.
If the economy had a ﬁnite horizon it would be characterized by a ﬁnite number
of equations and unknowns. In that case the number of degrees of freedom in
conducting policy is a ﬁnite number that does not depend on whether policy is
conducted with constant functions, functions of future, current or past variables,
as long as these functions are truly exogenous, i.e. independent from the remaining
equilibrium conditions.
T od e t e r m i n et h ed e g r e e so ff r e e d o mi nt h ec a s eo faﬁnite horizon economy
amounts to simply counting the number of equations and unknowns. We proceed
to considering the case where the economy lasts for a ﬁnite number of periods
T +1,f r o mp e r i o d0 to period T.A f t e rT, there is a subperiod for the clearing of
debts, where money can be used to pay debts, so that
WT+1 = MT + RTBT + PTGT − PTTT =0
The ﬁrst order conditions in the ﬁnite horizon economy are the intratemporal
conditions, (2.11) for t =0 ,...,T, the cash in advance constraints, (2.3) also for














, t =0 ,...,T − 1 (4.1)
and, for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T,a n ds t a t est, the budget constraints
T−t X
s=0
EtQt,t+s+1Mt+s (Rt+s − 1) = Wt +
T−t X
s=0




10The budget constraints restrict, not uniquely, the levels of state noncontingent
debts and taxes. Assuming these policy variables are not set exogenously we can










, t =0 ,...,T − 1 (4.2)
Note that the total number of money supplies and interest rates is the same.
There are Φ0 + Φ1 + ... + ΦT of each monetary policy variable. The number of
equations is Φ0 + Φ1 + ... + ΦT−1. In order for there to be a unique equilibrium
need to add to the system Φ0 + Φ1 + ... +2 ΦT independent restrictions. One
possibility is to set exogenously the interest rates in every state and in addition
the money supply in every terminal node. Similarly there is a unique equilibrium
if the money supply is set exogenously in every state and the interest rates are set
in every terminal node. In this sense, the two monetary instruments are equivalent
in this economy.
When policy is conducted with the forward looking feedback rule in Section 2,
t h ep o l i c yf o rt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei nt h et e r m i n a lp e r i o dRT, cannot be a function of
variables in period T +1 . If these rates are exogenous constants, it still remains
to determine the money supply in every state at T.
In this ﬁnite horizon economy there is an exact measure for the degrees of
freedom in conducting policy. In an economy that lasts from t =0to t = T,
these are Φ0+Φ1+...+2ΦT. This measure does not depend on how policy is con-
ducted, whether with constant functions or functions of endogenous variables, and
it also does not depend on price setting restrictions. The price setting restrictions
introduce as many variables as number of restrictions.
5. Robustness: Price setting restrictions
In this section we show that the results derived above extend to an environment
with prices set in advance. We modify the environment to consider price setting
restrictions. There is a continuum of goods, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each good i
is produced by a diﬀerent ﬁrm. The ﬁrms are monopolistic competitive and set
prices in advance with diﬀerent lags.


























The households’ intertemporal and intratemporal conditions are as before, (2.5),
(2.6) and (2.7).












,θ > 0 (5.2)
Given the prices on each good i in units of money, Pt(i), the government minimizes

















di = AtNt. (5.4)
We consider now that ﬁrms set prices in advance. A fraction αj ﬁrms set prices
j periods in advance with j =0 ,...J −1. Firms decide the price for period t with
the information up to period t − j to maximize:
Et−j [Qt−j,t+1 (pt(i)yt(i) − Wtnt(i))]
subject to the production function
yt(i) ≤ Atnt(i)





































When we compare the two sets of equilibrium conditions, under ﬂexible and
prices set in advance, here we are adding more variables, the prices of the dif-
ferently restricted ﬁrms, but we also add the same number of equations. This
argument works in this case, because can write the new equations as functions of
current and past variables.
6. Concluding Remarks
The problem of multiplicity of equilibria under an interest rate policy has been ad-
dressed, after McCallum (1981), by an extensive literature on determinacy under
interest rate rules. Interest rate feedback rules on endogenous variables such as
the inﬂation rate can, with appropriately chosen coeﬃcients, deliver determinate
equilibria. There are still multiple equilibria but only one of those equilibria stays
in the proximity of a steady state.
In this paper we show that in a simple monetary model with ﬂexible prices or
prices set in advance there are interest rate feedback rules, and also money supply
feedback rules, that implement unique equilibria. The interest rate feedback rules
are forward rules that resemble the policy rules that central banks appear to
follow.
13The results are not robust to the following change in the theoretical environ-
ment. The model economy has an inﬁnite horizon. Suppose that we considered
instead the analogous ﬁnite horizon economy. In that economy, for an arbitrarily
large horizon, there would be no single instrument feedback rules to implement
unique equilibria.
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